(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 1 - D. Massachusetts - 10/05

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

District of Massachusetts

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V.

JAMES J. BULGER

Case Number: 1: 99 CR 10371 - 03 - DJC

AMENDED JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

USM Number: 02182-748

J.W. Carney, Henry B. Brennan

			onal documents attached
		Transcript Excerpt of Sentencia	ng Hearing
THE DEFENDA	NT.		
pleaded guilty to co	•		
pleaded nolo conte	· · ·		
which was accepte			
was found guilty of after a plea of not g		- 26ss, 27ss, 39sss, 40sss, 42sss, 45sss, 48sss	
The defendant is adju-	dicated guilty of these offenses:	Additional Counts - See co	ntinuation page 🚺
Title & Section	Nature of Offense	Offense Ended	<u>Count</u>
18 USC § 1962(d)	Racketeering Conspiracy	01/01/00	lss
18 USC § 1962(c)	Racketeering	01/01/00	2ss
18 USC § 1951	Extortion Conspiracy "Rent"	12/31/96	3ss
18 USC § 1956(h)	Money Laundering	08/31/99	5ss
18 USC § 1956(a)(1)(B	Money Laundering		6ss-26ss
The defendant the Sentencing Reform	is sentenced as provided in pages 2 throun Act of 1984.	ugh 12 of this judgment. The sentence is	imposed pursuant to
The defendant has	been found not guilty on count(s)		
Count(s)	is	are dismissed on the motion of the United States.	
It is ordered to or mailing address untithe defendant must no	hat the defendant must notify the United Sil all fines, restitution, costs, and special as tify the court and United States attorney of	States attorney for this district within 30 days of any chassessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If of material changes in economic circumstances.	inge of name, residence, rdered to pay restitution,
		11/14/13	
		Date of Imposition of Judgment Signature of Judge	
		Denise J. Casper	
		Judge, U.S. District Court	
		Name and Title of Judge	
		<u> </u>	
		Hecember 16,2013	

Date

Case 1:99-cr-10371-DJC Document 1404 Filed 12/16/13 Page 2 of 12

SAO 245B(05-MA)

(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 1A - D. Massachusetts - 10/05

Judgment—Page 2 of 12

DEFENDANT: JAMES J. BULGER

CASE NUMBER: 1: 99 CR 10371 - 03 - DJC

ADDITIONAL COUNTS OF CONVICTION

Title & Section	Nature of Offense	Offense Ended	<u>Count</u>
18 USC § 1956	Money Laundering	07/31/96	27ss
18 USC § 924(c)	Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Violent Crime	12/31/99	39sss
18 USC § 924(c)	Possession of Machine Guns in Furtherance of Violent Crime	12/31/99	40sss
26 USC § 5841	Possession of Unregistered Machine Guns	12/31/99	42sss
18 USC § 922(o)	Transfer and Possession of Machine Guns	12/31/99	45sss
18 USC § 922(k)	Possession of Firearms with Obliterated Serial Numbers	12/31/99	48sss

SAO 245B(05-MA)

(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 2 - D. Massachusetts - 10/05

DEFENDANT: JAMES J. BULGER	Judgment — Page 3 of 12
CASE NUMBER: 1: 99 CR 10371 - 03 - DJC	
IMPRISO	NMENT
The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United	States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a
total term of: life	
followed by a consecutive minimum mandatory term of 5 of life. This term consists of terms of life on Counts 1ss at	
The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau	of Prisons:
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States N	Marshal.
The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for t	his district:
at a.m p.m.	on
as notified by the United States Marshal.	
The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the insti	tution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:
before 2 p.m. on	
as notified by the United States Marshal.	
as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.	
	
RETU	JRN
I have executed this judgment as follows:	
Defendant delivered on	to
a, with a certified copy	of this judgment.
	UNITED STATES MARSHAL
_	
ı	By

♠AO 245B(05-MA)

(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 2A - D. Massachusetts - 10/05

DEFENDANT: JAMES J. BULGER

CASE NUMBER: 1: 99 CR 10371 - 03 - DJC

Judgment—Page 4 of 12

ADDITIONAL IMPRISONMENT TERMS

and 27ss, terms of 120 months of Counts 42sss and 45sss, and a term of 60 months on Count 48sss, all to be served concurrently. This also consists of a term of 60 months on Count 39sss, and life on Count 40sss, to be served consecutively to all other terms of imprisonment imposed and consecutively to one another.

on the attached page.

(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 3 - D. Massachusetts - 10/05

DEFENDANT	JAME	S J. BULGI	ER				Judgment-	-Page _	5	of _	12
CASE NUMB		CR 10371		- DJC							
			S	UPERVI	ISED REL	EASE		\checkmark	See cont	tinuatio	n page
Upon release fro	m imprisonm	ent, the defenda	ant shall	be on super	vised release f	or a term of:	5	year(s)			
on Counts 1s concurrently.	s, 2ss, 39sss	s and 40sss a	nd 3 ye	ears on Co	ounts 3ss, 5ss	s-27ss, 42sss	s, 45sss, 48	sss to b	e serve	ed .	Ð
The defend custody of the B	ant must repo ureau of Priso	ort to the probations.	ion offic	ce in the dist	rict to which t	he defendant is	released wit	hin 72 ho	ours of r	elease	from the
The defendant sl	nall not comm	nit another feder	al, state	or local crir	ne.						
The defendant si substance. The thereafter, not to	detendant sha	ll submit to one	drug te	st within 15	days of release	e from imprisoi	n from any un nment and at	lawful us least two	se of a c periodi	ontroll c drug	led tests
		ondition is susp (Check, if appli		based on the	court's determ	nination that th	e defendant p	oses a lo	w risk c	of	
The defend	ant shall not p	possess a fiream	n, amm	unition, dest	ructive device,	or any other d	angerous we	apon. (C	heck, if	applic	able.)
The defend	ant shall coop	perate in the col	lection	of DNA as d	irected by the	probation offic	er. (Check,	if applica	ble.)		
	_	ster with the sta e probation off		_		in the state wh	nere the defer	ndant resi	des, wo	rks, or	is a
The defend	ant shall parti	cipate in an app	proved p	rogram for o	domestic viole	nce. (Check, it	f applicable.)				
If this judg Schedule of Pay	ment imposes ments sheet o	a fine or restitu f this judgment.	ition, it	is a condition	n of supervised	d release that th	ne defendant	pay in ac	cordanc	e with	the

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

The defendant must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any additional conditions

- 1) the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without the permission of the court or probation officer;
- 2) the defendant shall report to the probation officer and shall submit a truthful and complete written report within the first five days of each month;
- 3) the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer;
- 4) the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities;
- 5) the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation, unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons;
- 6) the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change in residence or employment;
- 7) the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician;
- 8) the defendant shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered;
- 9) the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity and shall not associate with any person convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer;
- 10) the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the probation officer;
- 11) the defendant shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer;
- 12) the defendant shall not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency without the permission of the court; and
- as directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's criminal record or personal history or characteristics and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm the defendant's compliance with such notification requirement.

Case 1:99-cr-10371-DJC Document 1404 Filed 12/16/13 Page 6 of 12

SAO 245B(05-MA)

(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 4A - Continuation Page - Supervised Release/Probation -10/05

)FFFNDANT:	JAMES J. BUL	GER
JEFFNIJA NII	OTIVIDO OF DOL	

CASE NUMBER: 1: 99 CR 10371 - 03 - DJC

Judgment—Page ____6 of ____12

ADDITIONAL ✓ SUPERVISED RELEASE ☐ PROBATION TERMS

The defendant shall not have any contact with any of the victims or family members of the victims.

The defendant is to pay the balance of any restitution imposed according to a court-ordered repayment schedule.

The defendant is prohibited from incurring new credit charges or opening additional lines of credit without the approval of the Probation Office while any financial obligations remain outstanding.

The defendant is to provide the Probation Office access to any requested financial information, which may be shared with the Financial Litigation Unit of the U.S. Attorney's Office.

Continuation of Conditions of Supe	ervised Release Probation
------------------------------------	-------------------------------

SAO 245B(05-MA)

(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 5 - D. Massachusetts - 10/05

	Sheet 5 - D. Massachusetts - 10/05					
	IAMES I DILICED	Judgment — Page	7	of	12	
DEFENDANT:	JAMES J. BULGER	-		_		
	1: 99 CR 10371 - 03 - DJC					
	CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTI	ES				

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

		•			F-7	
TOTALS	Asses \$	<u>sment</u> \$3,100.00	\$	<u>Fine</u>	\$	Restitution \$25,588,551.56
	ermination of the determination		d until A	n <i>Amended Judgn</i>	nent in a Crimir	nal Case (AO 245C) will be entered
The defe	endant must m	ake restitution (inc	luding community r	estitution) to the fol	llowing payees in	the amount listed below.
If the de the prior before the	fendant make ity order or p ne United Stat	s a partial payment, ercentage payment es is paid.	each payee shall rec column below. Hov	ceive an approximat wever, pursuant to	tely proportioned 18 U.S.C. § 3664	payment, unless specified otherwise in (i), all nonfederal victims must be paid
Name of Pay	<u>/ee</u>	Tota	ıl Loss*	Restituțio	n Ordered	Priority or Percentage
See attachme	nt			\$25	,588,551.56	
						See Continuation Page
TOTALS		\$	\$0.00	\$ <u>25,588,</u>	551.56	
The defifteent	fendant must p h day after the	date of the judgme	tution and a fine of	J.S.C. § 3612(f). A		on or fine is paid in full before the options on Sheet 6 may be subject
The co	art determined	I that the defendant	does not have the al	bility to pay interest	t and it is ordered	that:
	_	rement is waived for rement for the		restitution.	as follows:	

^{*} Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

♠AO 245B(05-MA)

(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 6 - D. Massachusetts - 10/05

DEFENDANT: JAMES J. BULGER

CASE NUMBER: 1: 99 CR 10371 - 03 - DJC

Judgment — Page 8 of 12

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties are due as follows:	
A Lump sum payment of \$ \$\frac{\$3,100.00}{}\$ due immediately, balance due	
not later than, or F below; or	
B Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with C, D, or F below); or	
Payment in equal (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ over (e.g., months or years), to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judg	a period of ment; or
Payment in equal (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ over (e.g., months or years), to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprison term of supervision; or	a period of onment to a
Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant's ability to pay at t	
F Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:	
Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Responsibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court. The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.	alties is due during Inmate Financial
Joint and Several	See Continuation Page
Defendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers (including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint and Sev and corresponding payee, if appropriate.	veral Amount,
The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution. The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s): The defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States:	
See attached orders of forfeiture.	

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) fine principal, (5) fine interest, (6) community restitution, (7) penalties, and (8) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

AO 245B (Rev. 06/05) Criminal Judgment

Attachment (Page 1) — Statement of Reasons - D. Massachusetts - 10/05

DEFENDANT:

JAMES J. BULGER

Judgment — Page 9 of 12

CASE NUMBER: 1: 99 CR 10371 - 03 - DJC

DISTRICT:

MASSACHUSETTS

STATEMENT OF REASONS

	A	√	The court adopts the presentence investigation report without change.
	В		The court adopts the presentence investigation report with the following changes. (Check all that apply and specify court determination, findings, or comments, referencing paragraph numbers in the presentence report, if applicable (Use Section VIII if necessary.)
		I	Chapter Two of the U.S.S.G. Manual determinations by court (including changes to base offense level, or specific offense characteristics):
		2	Chapter Three of the U.S.S.G. Manual determinations by court (including changes to victim-related adjustments, role in the offense, obstruction of justice, multiple counts, or acceptance of responsibility):
		3	Chapter Four of the U.S.S.G. Manual determinations by court (including changes to criminal history category or scores, career offender, or criminal livelihood determinations):
		4	Additional Comments or Findings (including comments or factual findings concerning certain information in the presentence report that the Federal Bureau of Prisons may rely on when it makes inmate classification, designation, or programming decisions):
	С		The record establishes no need for a presentence investigation report pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.
I	CC	OURT	FINDING ON MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCE (Check all that apply.)
I	CC A	DURT	FINDING ON MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCE (Check all that apply.) No count of conviction carries a mandatory minimum sentence.
I		_	
I	A		No count of conviction carries a mandatory minimum sentence.
Ĭ	A B		No count of conviction carries a mandatory minimum sentence. Mandatory minimum sentence imposed. One or more counts of conviction alleged in the indictment carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, but the sentence imposed is below a mandatory minimum term because the court has determined that the mandatory minimum
I	A B		No count of conviction carries a mandatory minimum sentence. Mandatory minimum sentence imposed. One or more counts of conviction alleged in the indictment carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, but the sentence imposed is below a mandatory minimum term because the court has determined that the mandatory minimum does not apply based on findings of fact in this case substantial assistance (18 U.S.C. § 3553(e))
I	A B		No count of conviction carries a mandatory minimum sentence. Mandatory minimum sentence imposed. One or more counts of conviction alleged in the indictment carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, but the sentence imposed is below a mandatory minimum term because the court has determined that the mandatory minimum does not apply based on findings of fact in this case
	A B C		No count of conviction carries a mandatory minimum sentence. Mandatory minimum sentence imposed. One or more counts of conviction alleged in the indictment carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, but the sentence imposed is below a mandatory minimum term because the court has determined that the mandatory minimum does not apply based on findings of fact in this case substantial assistance (18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)) the statutory safety valve (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f))
11	A B C	□ √ □	No count of conviction carries a mandatory minimum sentence. Mandatory minimum sentence imposed. One or more counts of conviction alleged in the indictment carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, but the sentence imposed is below a mandatory minimum term because the court has determined that the mandatory minimum does not apply based on findings of fact in this case substantial assistance (18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)) the statutory safety valve (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f))
	A B C To	DURT tal Offiminal	No count of conviction carries a mandatory minimum sentence. Mandatory minimum sentence imposed. One or more counts of conviction alleged in the indictment carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, but the sentence imposed is below a mandatory minimum term because the court has determined that the mandatory minimum does not apply based on findings of fact in this case substantial assistance (18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)) the statutory safety valve (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)) DETERMINATION OF ADVISORY GUIDELINE RANGE (BEFORE DEPARTURES): ense Level: 43 History Category: 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 1
	A B C C To Cri	DURT tal Offi	No count of conviction carries a mandatory minimum sentence. Mandatory minimum sentence imposed. One or more counts of conviction alleged in the indictment carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, but the sentence imposed is below a mandatory minimum term because the court has determined that the mandatory minimum does not apply based on findings of fact in this case substantial assistance (18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)) the statutory safety valve (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)) DETERMINATION OF ADVISORY GUIDELINE RANGE (BEFORE DEPARTURES): ense Level: 43

AO 245B (05-MA) (Rev. 06/05) Criminal Judgment

Attachment (Page 2) — Statement of Reasons - D. Massachusetts - 10/05

DEFENDANT: JAMES J. BULGER

CASE NUMBER: 1: 99 CR 10371 - 03 - DJC

DISTRICT: MASSACHUSETTS

STATEMENT OF REASONS

Judgment — Page 10 of

12

IV	Αľ)VI	SORY GUIDELINE SENTENCI	NG DETER	RMINATION (Check only one.)		
	Α		The sentence is within an advisory g	uideline range	that is not greater than 24 months, and	d the cou	rt finds no reason to depart.
	В	Ø	The sentence is within an advisory g (Use Section VIII if necessary.)	uideline range	that is greater than 24 months, and the	e specific	sentence is imposed for these reasons.
	C		The court departs from the advisory (Also complete Section V.)	guideline ran	ge for reasons authorized by the senten	cing guid	delines manual.
	D		The court imposed a sentence outsid	le the advisory	sentencing guideline system. (Also con	nplete Sec	etion VI.)
V	DE	EPA	RTURES AUTHORIZED BY TH	HE ADVISO	DRY SENTENCING GUIDELI	NES (I	f applicable.)
	A		be sentence imposed departs (Chec below the advisory guideline rang above the advisory guideline rang	ge):		
	В	De	parture based on (Check all that a	apply.):			
	5K1.1 plea agreemen 5K3.1 plea agreemen binding plea agreement plea agreement for d plea agreement that 2 Motion Not Addressed in 5K1.1 government in 5K3.1 government in government motion defense motion for d defense motion for d 3 Other			nt based on to nt based on I ent for depar eparture, wh	and check reason(s) below.): the defendant's substantial assista Early Disposition or "Fast-track" trure accepted by the court tich the court finds to be reasonable government will not oppose a defendance.	Progran ole	
				notion based notion based for departure eparture to v	reement (Check all that apply and on the defendant's substantial as on Early Disposition or "Fast-tra which the government did not obj which the government objected	sistance .ck" pro	
				raamant or n	action by the portion for departure	(Chaol	v reacon(s) helow):
Other than a plea agreement or motion by the parties for departure (C C Reason(s) for Departure (Check all that apply other than 5K1.1 or 5K3.1.)					(Circui	reason(s) below.j.	
	4A1 5H1 5H1 5H1 5H1 5H1 5H1 5K2.0	1 2 3 4 5 6	Criminal History Inadequacy Age Education and Vocational Skills Mental and Emotional Condition Physical Condition Employment Record Family Ties and Responsibilities Military Record, Charitable Service, Good Works Aggravating or Mitigating Circumstances	SK2.1 SK2.2 SK2.3 SK2.4 SK2.5 SK2.6 SK2.7 SK2.8 SK2.9 SK2.10	Death Physical Injury Extreme Psychological Injury Abduction or Unlawful Restraint Property Damage or Loss Weapon or Dangerous Weapon Disruption of Government Function Extreme Conduct Criminal Purpose Victim's Conduct	51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51	K2.11 Lesser Harm K2.12 Coercion and Duress K2.13 Diminished Capacity K2.14 Public Welfare K2.16 Voluntary Disclosure of Offense K2.17 High-Capacity, Semiautomatic Weapon K2.18 Violent Street Gang K2.20 Aberrant Behavior K2.21 Dismissed and Uncharged Conduct K2.22 Age or Health of Sex Offenders K2.23 Discharged Terms of Imprisonment other guideline basis (e.g., 2B1.1 commentary)

D Explain the facts justifying the departure. (Use Section VIII if necessary.)

AO 245B (05-MA) (Rev. 06/05) Criminal Judgment
Attachment (Page 3) — Statement of Reasons - D. Massachusetts 10/05

DEFENDANT: JAMES J. BULGER

Judgment — Page 11 of

12

CASE NUMBER: 1: 99 CR 10371 - 03 - DJC

DISTRICT: MASSACHUSETTS

VI

	STATEMENT OF REASONS
	URT DETERMINATION FOR SENTENCE OUTSIDE THE ADVISORY GUIDELINE SYSTEM eck all that apply.)
A	The sentence imposed is (Check only one.): ☐ below the advisory guideline range ☐ above the advisory guideline range
В	Sentence imposed pursuant to (Check all that apply.):
	Plea Agreement (Check all that apply and check reason(s) below.): binding plea agreement for a sentence outside the advisory guideline system accepted by the court plea agreement for a sentence outside the advisory guideline system, which the court finds to be reasonable plea agreement that states that the government will not oppose a defense motion to the court to sentence outside the advisory guideline system
	Motion Not Addressed in a Plea Agreement (Check all that apply and check reason(s) below.): government motion for a sentence outside of the advisory guideline system defense motion for a sentence outside of the advisory guideline system to which the government did not object defense motion for a sentence outside of the advisory guideline system to which the government objected
	Other Other than a plea agreement or motion by the parties for a sentence outside of the advisory guideline system (Check reason(s) below.):
C	Reason(s) for Sentence Outside the Advisory Guideline System (Check all that apply.)
	the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C)) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D)) to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)) to provide restitution to any victims of the offense (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7))

D Explain the facts justifying a sentence outside the advisory guideline system. (UseSection VIII if necessary.)

AO 245B (05-MA) (Rev. 06/05) Criminal Judgment

Attachment (Page 4) -- Statement of Reasons - D. Massachusetts - 10/05

DEFENDANT:

JAMES J. BULGER

Judgment — Page 12 of

12

CASE NUMBER: 1: 99 CR 10371 - 03 - DJC

DISTRICT:

MASSACHUSETTS

STATEMENT OF REASONS

VII	COU	URT	DET	ERMINATIONS OF	RESTITUTION		
	Α		Res	titution Not Applicab	le.		
	В	Total Amount of Restitution: Restitution not ordered (Check o			25,588,551.56		
	C				only one.):		
		1			stitution is otherwise mandatory under 18 arge as to make restitution impracticable	•	ordered because the number of
For offenses for which restitution is otherwise mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, restitution is not ordered because determining complex issues of fact and relating them to the cause or amount of the victims' losses would complicate or prolong the sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution to any victim would be outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3)(3)(3)(3)(3)(3)(3)(3)(3)(3)(3)(3)(3)							ong the sentencing process to a degree
		3		ordered because the comp	ch restitution is authorized under 18 U.S. lication and prolongation of the sentenci tion to any victims under 18 U.S.C. § 36	ng process resulting from the fashion	
		4		Restitution is not ordered	for other reasons. (Explain.)		
)NA		red for these reasons (18 U.S.C. state of the sentence in This easons.		
			. Sec	o. No.: 000-00-0000	nd VII of the Statement of Reaso	ns form must be completed in Date of Imposition of $\frac{11/14/13}{11/14/13}$	of Judgment
Defendant's Date of Birth: 00-00-1929						Signature of Judge	<u>66/m</u>
Defendant's Residence Address:						Denise J. Casper	Judge, U.S. District Court
Defendant's Mailing Address:				Address:		Name and Title of the Date Signed	20cmber 16 2013

1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS				
2					
3					
4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,				
5	Plaintiff, Criminal Action No. 99-10371-DJC				
6	V. November 14, 2013				
7	JAMES J. BULGER, 10:00 a.m.				
8	Defendant.				
9					
10					
11	TRANSCRIPT OF STATEMENT OF REASONS				
12	BEFORE THE HONORABLE DENISE J. CASPER				
13	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT				
14	JOHN J. MOAKLEY U.S. COURTHOUSE				
15	1 COURTHOUSE WAY				
16	BOSTON, MA 02210				
17					
18					
19					
20	DEBRA M. JOYCE, RMR, CRR				
21	Official Court Reporter John J. Moakley U.S. Courthouse				
22	1 Courthouse Way, Room 5204 Boston, MA 02210				
23	joycedebra@gmail.com				
24					
25					

* * * * * * *

2

THE COURT: Good morning, counsel.

3

Good morning, Mr. Bulger.

4 5

your sentence, I'll then announce the sentence, and then

Mr. Bulger, I'm going to first explain my reasons for

THE COURT: In terms of my reasons for this sentence,

6

finally I'll ask you to rise for the formal imposition of

7

sentence.

8

9

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

. . . .

10:01 10 Mr. Bulger, it is hard to know where to begin. Do I begin in

11

1972, over 40 years ago, when the racketeering conspiracy of

12

which you stand convicted began? Or do I begin in late 1994,

13

early 1995 when you fled Massachusetts upon learning of the

14

impending charges against you? Or on June 22, 2011 when you

15

fugitive from justice? Or do I simply begin with a recitation

were finally arrested after approximately 16 years as a

17

16

of the names of the people you've now been found by a jury

18

beyond a reasonable doubt to have murdered: Mr. Paul McGonagle,

19

Mr. Edward Connors, Mr. Thomas King, Mr. Richard Castucci,

10:02 20

Mr. Roger Wheeler, Mr. Brian Halloran, Mr. Michael Donahue,

21

Mr. John Callahan, Mr. Arthur Barrett, Mr. John McIntyre, and

22

Ms. Deborah Hussey, or the numbers of others who I won't name

23

at this moment whom you and your associates put in fear of loss

24

of life or serious harm to advance your own financial goals and

25

criminal enterprise?

10:03 20

10:03 10

It is hard to know where to begin, but let me begin, Mr. Bulger, where I always do at sentencings, to talk about the matters I must and I have considered in reaching a just and appropriate sentence.

In consideration of what a reasonable sentence would be here, I've considered all of the factors under Title 18, United States Code, 3553(a), including, but not limited to, the nature and circumstances of your crimes, your personal history and background, the advisory guideline sentencing range, and the need for the sentence to do many things, including reflect the seriousness of the offenses, promote respect for the law, provide adequate deterrence, avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, give restitution to the victims, and constitute just punishment.

First, I've considered the nature and circumstances of your crimes. The scope, the callousness, the depravity of your crimes are almost unfathomable. As the presiding judge, I was certainly aware of the range of criminal allegations against you before the trial began, but even so, even having some sense of the subject matter to expect at this trial, the testimony of human suffering that you and your associates inflicted on others was at times agonizing to hear and painful to watch.

At times during the trial I wished that we were watching a movie, that what we were hearing was not real, but as the families of the victims here know too well, it was not a

5

10:04 10

10:05 20

movie. At trial we were hearing about the real inhumane things that human beings did to other human beings, seemingly without remorse and without regret.

Moreover, the upshot of all of the evidence at trial was that at base the motivation for your entire criminal enterprise was money: Money in extorting more money; money in threatening or harming those who didn't pay up to you or, in your estimation, didn't pay up enough; money in dominating the drug trade in South Boston; money being laundered through businesses that you controlled in the names of others; money in coopting certain law enforcement officers and agents; and money in killing people who might bring down your organization for cooperating with legitimate law enforcement officers. Your crimes, in my estimation, are made all the more heinous because they were all about money.

Mr. Bulger, I don't doubt for a second that you're an intelligent person, intelligent enough to prey upon those who had no legal recourse. You extorted money from other criminals, large-scale drug dealers, bookmakers, loan sharks whom you convinced needed your protection, and those who were otherwise beholden to you.

By the time you extorted money from legitimate businessmen, your reputation for violence and for having coopted law enforcement was so well-established that they also found themselves with no recourse and could only comply with

your demands.

But make no mistake, it takes no business acumen to take money from folks at the end of a gun, no business acumen to shove a machine gun in the groin of Mr. Solimando or place a shotgun in Mr. Buccheri's mouth. It's not savvy, it's not being shrewd, it's not being resourceful, it's what anyone can get at the end of a gun. Very few, thankfully, choose to do so, but you and those at your direction did.

I certainly cannot convey the true nature of your crimes without discussing the nature and circumstances of the murders you've now been found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed. I will not recount the grim and gruesome details of these 11 murders, but I will only note that we heard at trial about the brutal manner in which each of these victims was killed. Some were tortured at length and then killed, some were shot at close range, some were ambushed in a hail of bullets or otherwise executed. Each of these lives came to an unceremonious end at your hands or at the hands of others at your direction. And as if that unceremonious end was not enough, we heard how these victims' bodies were left to expire at the scene of the crime, stuffed in a trunk, or in a few instances, buried at the beach or in a basement, only to be later unearthed and reburied in a field. Unfathomable acts conducted in unfathomable ways.

The pain and suffering that the families of these

10:06 10

11

12

13

1

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

14 15

16

17 18

19

10:07 20

21

22

23

24

25

10:08 20

10:08 10

victims have endured was communicated very movingly yesterday and in the letters that I've received and reviewed. These family members recounted that even after all these many years, many are still picking up the pieces left in the large wake of your horrific acts, or as one family member put it, as a result of the persistent, unyielding, and unpredictable brutality that you and others inflicted.

Loss of a loved one is pain enough, but to lose a loved one to violence, to murder, is unimaginable, and I thank these family members for their attempts to put that pain into words for me.

Their loss was made all the more unimaginable,

Mr. Bulger, because these families had to wait years, decades,

to know what end their loved ones met, and in some cases to

bury them with the respect that everyone who meets their end in

life deserves.

I do want to note, even if I had not heard from the families of victims whose predicates were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, even if I had not heard from those victims' families about what they had to say about your background, character, and conduct, I want to make very clear that I would have come to the same sentence that I impose today, because the conduct which the jury found proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt in and of itself merits the most severe penalty.

10:10 20

10:09 10

Mr. Bulger, the nature and circumstances of your crimes, however, are not the only factors that I've considered.

Second, I've considered your personal history and characteristics. You chose not to be interviewed by Probation for the presentence report, that's certainly your right, as I mentioned yesterday, but it gives me less than I usually have in the normal course when sentencing a defendant.

Nevertheless, from that document I've gleaned that you are 84 years old, you have a high school diploma, and a criminal history that dates back some time.

I certainly cannot conclude a discussion of your personal background without discussing how you spent 16 years of your life before your arrest on the charges in this case in 2011.

Sir, you chose to be a fugitive from justice. You remained a fugitive for 16 years. In the meantime, for the lives of the victims' families, milestone after milestone was passed without their loved ones. Instead of, sir, remaining in Massachusetts to answer these charges in a timely fashion and pressing the defenses that you presented to this jury and your arguments that you presented to this Court, you remained a fugitive, traveling and living in various locations under various identities until 2011. Then, you were finally apprehended in a residence with walls that even after 16 years on the run contained over \$822,000 in cash. Whatever

10:11 20

10:11 10

righteousness you claim in your defenses is surely undermined by your being on the run for such a long time. And all of the signs in your Santa Monica apartment, the large sums of cash, the IDs in multiple names, and the firearms, suggest that you intended to remain a fugitive for all time.

Mr. Bulger, I do also feel compelled at this juncture to say something about what has now become your repeated position, that your trial was a sham. It will certainly be for another court, another court in this building, in fact, to rule on the correctness of my legal rulings, but there's nothing about the consideration I gave those legal issues and the protection of your rights as a criminal defendant, the excellent advocacy that you received in your defense, the verdict that was rendered by this jury, and the respect that I have shown you from day one in these proceedings that was a sham. You can call it what you want, but in my humble estimation, you received the fair and full trial that every defendant in this country is entitled to.

Third, I've considered the advisory guideline sentencing range. That range is quite literally off the charts, maxing out at a total offense level of 43 for a life sentence to be followed by minimum mandatory sentences.

Fourth, I've considered the need for the sentence to provide restitution to the victims. There can be no particular disagreement about providing restitution to those who qualify

under the statutory definition of "victim" under Title 18,
United States Code, 3663A which mandates such restitution.
That Act provides a broad definition of "victim" and is
intended not as a punitive measure but an attempt at allowing
victims to recoup losses.

I've considered whether an argument could be made that the victims of the predicates not proven at trial are not victims under this Act, under the CVRA, and there are just a few claimants that fall into this category. However, such argument would ignore, one, that you were convicted and found guilty of the RICO conspiracy count in Count One of the third superseding indictment; and two, the standard of preponderance of the evidence that governs here at sentencing.

As to the first point, the 1st Circuit has said, "In the context of a conspiracy, it is clear that a defendant is liable in restitution to all of the victims of the reasonably foreseeable acts of his co-conspirators. No court has ever held to the contrary." That's quoting from <u>United States v. Collins</u>, 209 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999), addressing the same definition of "victim" under Section 3663. I would also cite to <u>United States v. Bradley</u>, 644 F.3d 1213, 1298 (11th Cir. 2011), cited in the government's papers, as well as <u>United States v. Marcello</u>, 2009 WL 929959, *2 (N.D. of Illinois 2009), which was affirmed in part and reversed in part, although on a separate ground, by the 7th Circuit. That is, even as the

10:13 10

10:13 20

10:15 20

10:15 10

jury, Mr. Bulger, concluded that it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that you committed certain racketeering acts of murder under either a substantive theory, an aiding and abetting theory, or joint venture theory, it remains the case that you were convicted of the overarching conspiracy which alleged these acts as part of the scheme in Count One, and that the key witnesses against you as to those acts, Mr. Martorano and Mr. Flemmi, admitted their own involvement in each of these murders. Even if this could not be concluded from the verdict rendered, under the preponderance of the evidence standard, I conclude that such acts were at least committed by those co-defendants in furtherance of the scheme alleged in Count One and were reasonably foreseeable as part of the conspiracy for which you stand convicted.

I should note that there's nothing about this conclusion or applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, which governs, frankly, all rulings by a sentencing judge in any sentencing, that undermines the verdict, the carefully considered verdict that was rendered by the jury in this case.

Accordingly, I'll allow all of the pending claims made for restitution with the following note; and that is, I do note that I only allow these claims to the extent that they claimed lost income, funeral expenses, stolen property, but not the non-recoverable components of pain and suffering and loss of

10:17 20

10:16 10

consortium. Although calculating restitution is not an exact science, and in fact, neither party disputed the amounts sought here, I only allow those claims in which I was provided with sufficient supporting information to make a reasonable estimation of restitution.

Fifth and finally, Mr. Bulger, I have considered all of the purposes of sentencing. Let me begin by saying you did not accomplish many of your crimes by yourself. You had co-defendants, some of whom I've mentioned and some of whom testified against you. You had associates, and, yes, you had -- certainly had some well-placed law enforcement officers on your payroll and in your pocket. Others are not blameless in the wrong that has been done here. There is culpability to go all around, but you, sir, are the only defendant before me, and it is your sentence that I have to determine. I must impose a just, fair, and adequate sentence for your crimes and your responsibility for these crimes.

The most serious crimes deserve the most serious punishment. It's difficult here to talk about general deterrence or even unwarranted sentencing disparities in a case that I hope is sui generis, but if there is to be any deterrent effect, it must be for me to mete out a sentence that recognizes the seriousness of your crimes; any less would not show sufficient respect for the law or the rule of law.

I have also struggled with what would ever be just

10:19 20

10:18 10

punishment for the unfathomable harm that you have caused, and I know that any sentence I impose will be cold comfort for the losses that so many have suffered.

Much ink has been spilled about you, Mr. Bulger, your impact on the city, on South Boston in particular, your flight, and this trial. I imagine in the wake of this judgment and the close of this criminal case that there will be much more ink written about you, some of which you may solicit and some of which you won't. You have over time and in certain quarters become a face of this city. That is regrettable. You and others may be deluded into thinking that you represent this city, but you, sir, do not represent this city.

This year, 2013, with all that's happened in this city, the City of Boston, both tragic and triumphant, you and the horrible things that were recounted by your cohorts during the course of this trial do not and should not represent this city.

If anything represents this city from this trial it's that after an orderly proceeding in which both parties were very well represented by counsel, a jury did the hard work that jurors do and rendered a fair and just verdict that reflected careful review of the evidence and application of the law.

And in the wake of that, Mr. Bulger, and after careful weighing of all of the factors under Section 3553(a) and in the exercise of my discretion, I shall impose a sentence of life

imprisonment, plus five years, plus life imprisonment for the counts of the third superseding indictment for which you were convicted.

For all of the reasons that I previously stated, I believe this sentence is reasonable under the facts and circumstances of this case and is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to accomplish the goals of sentencing.

I note for the record that I understand that I'm not bound by the advisory guideline sentencing range and that I have discretion to vary from that range, but I choose not to exercise my discretion in that manner.

* * * * * *

10:20 10

United States v. Bulger, 99-10371-DJC

Addendum to Judgment Regarding Restitution

Estate of Arthur Barrett	\$735,508.00
Richard Buccheri	\$200,000.00
Estate of John Callahan	\$3,303,160.43
Estate of Richard Castucci	\$3,247,600.00
Estate of Edward Connors	\$1,770,800.00
Estate of Debra Davis	\$1,800,000.00
Estate of Michael Donahue	\$2,280,708.00
Estate of Brian Halloran	\$111,000.00
Estate of Paul McGonagle	\$4,495,000.00
Estate of Michael Milano	\$1,001,000.00
Estate of Al Plummer	\$380,500.00
Michael Solimando	\$185,000.00
Estate of Roger Wheeler	\$6,078,275.13
TOTAL	\$25,588,551.56

•UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)	
)	
v.)	Criminal No. 99-10371-DJC
)	
JAMES J. BULGER,)	
Defendant.)	

ORDER OF FORFEITURE (MONEY JUDGMENT)

CASPER, D.J.

WHEREAS, on May 23, 2001, a federal grand jury sitting in the District of Massachusetts returned a forty-eight count Third Superseding Indictment charging defendant James J. Bulger (the "Defendant"), and others, with Racketeering Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count One); Racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Count Two); Extortion Conspiracy: "Rent", in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count Three); Extortion of Kevin Hayes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2 (Count Four); Money Laundering Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i) and 2 (Counts Six through Twenty-Six); Money Laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a) (1) (A) (i), 1956(a) (1) (B) (i) and 2 (Count Twenty-Seven); Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Violent Crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2 (Count Thirty-Nine); Possession of Machineguns in Furtherance of Violent Crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5845(a), 5861(d), and 5871, and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Forty-Two); Transfer and Possession of Machineguns, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o) and 2 (Count Forty-Five); and Possession of

Firearms with Obliterated Serial Numbers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(k) and 2 (Count Forty-Eight);¹

WHEREAS, the Third Superseding Indictment contained Racketeering Forfeiture

Allegations, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963, which sought the forfeiture, as a result of the offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, as set forth in Counts One and Two, of (i) all interests the defendants have acquired and maintained in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, wherever located, and in whatever names held; (ii) all interests in, securities of, claims against, and properties and contractual rights of any kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which the defendants have established, operated, controlled, conducted, and participated in the conduct of, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962; and (iii) all property constituting, and derived from, any proceeds which the defendants obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962;²

WHEREAS, the Third Superseding Indictment further provided that, if any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any act or omission by the Defendants, (a) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; (b) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party; (c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the Court; (d) has been substantially diminished in value; or (e) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided

¹ The Defendant was not charged in the remaining Counts of the Third Superseding Indictment.

² The Third Superseding Indictment also contained Money Laundering Forfeiture Allegations, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982, which sought the forfeiture, as a result of the offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957, as set forth in Counts Five through Twenty-Seven, of all property, real and personal, involved in such offenses, and all property traceable to such property. Because the money laundering violations involved proceeds of his racketeering offenses, the United States sought entry of a money judgment for the proceeds of the Defendant's racketeering violations only.

without difficulty, the United States is entitled to seek forfeiture of any other property of the Defendant, up to the value of such assets, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m);

WHEREAS, on August 12, 2013, after a forty-one day jury trial, a jury found the Defendant guilty on the racketeering charges (Counts One and Two), as well as Counts Three, Five, Six through Twenty-Six, Twenty-Seven, Thirty-Nine, Forty, Forty-Two, Forty-Five, and Forty-Eight of the Third Superseding Indictment;

WHEREAS, the United States has filed a Motion for Order of Forfeiture (Money Judgment) that would consist of a personal money judgment against the Defendant, in the amount of \$25,162,800 in United States currency;

WHEREAS, accordingly, based on the evidence and testimony presented at trial, the Jury's August 12, 2013 verdict as to the Defendant, and the United States' Motion for Order of Forfeiture (Money Judgment), the United States is entitled to an Order of Forfeiture (Money Judgment) consisting of a personal money judgment against the Defendant, in the amount of \$25,162,800 in United States currency, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) and Rule 32.2(b)(1)(A), as this amount represents proceeds of the Defendant's racketeering conspiracy; and

WHEREAS, Rule 32.2(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "no ancillary proceeding is required to the extent that the forfeiture consists of a money judgment."

ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

- I. The Defendant shall forfeit to the United States the sum of \$25,162,800 in United States currency, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m).
- 2. This Court shall retain jurisdiction in the case for the purpose of enforcing this Order.

- 3. The United States may, at any time, move, pursuant to Rule 32.2(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to amend this Order to substitute property having a value not to exceed the amounts set forth in Paragraph 1 to satisfy the money judgment in whole or in part.
- 4. The United States may, at any time, conduct, pursuant to Rule 32.2(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 21 U.S.C. § 853(m), any discovery to identify, locate or dispose of forfeitable property or substitute assets, including, but not limited to, depositions and requests for documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things.
- 5. Pursuant to Rule 32.2(b)(4), this Order shall be included in the sentence pronounced and imposed by the Court at the sentencing hearing, and in the criminal judgment entered by this Court against the Defendant.

DENISE J. CASPER

United States District Judge

Date: November 14, 2013

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)		
•)		
v.)	Criminal No.	99-10371-DJC
)		
JAMES J. BULGER,)		
Defendant.)		

PRELIMINARY ORDER OF FORFEITURE (SPECIFIC ASSETS) . CASPER, D.J.

WHEREAS, on May 23, 2001, a federal grand jury sitting in the District of Massachusetts returned a forty-eight count Third Superseding Indictment charging defendant James J. Bulger (the "Defendant"), and others, with Racketeering Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count One); Racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Count Two); Extortion Conspiracy: "Rent", in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count Three); Extortion of Kevin Hayes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and 2 (Count Four); Money Laundering Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count Five); Money Laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2 (Counts Six through Twenty-Six); Money Laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2 (Count Twenty-Seven); Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Violent Crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 2 (Count Thirty-Nine); Possession of Machineguns in Furtherance of Violent Crime, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5841, 5845(a), 5861(d), and 5871, and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Forty-Two); Transfer and Possession of Machineguns, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 922(o) and 2 (Count Forty-Five); and Possession of Firearms with Obliterated Serial Numbers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(k) and 2 (Count Forty-Eight);¹

WHEREAS, the Third Superseding Indictment contained Racketeering Forfeiture

Allegations, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963, which sought the forfeiture, as a result of the offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, as set forth in Counts One and Two, of (i) all interests the defendants have acquired and maintained in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, wherever located, and in whatever names held; (ii) all interests in, securities of, claims against, and properties and contractual rights of any kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which the defendants have established, operated, controlled, conducted, and participated in the conduct of, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962; and (iii) all property constituting, and derived from, any proceeds which the defendants obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962;

WHEREAS, the Third Superseding Indictment further provided that, if any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any act or omission by the defendants, (a) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; (b) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party; (c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the Court; (d) has been substantially diminished in value; or (e) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without difficulty, the United States is entitled to seek forfeiture of any other property of the Defendant, up to the value of such assets, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m);

WHEREAS, on August 12, 2013, after a forty-one day jury trial, a jury found the Defendant guilty on the racketeering charges (Counts One and Two), as well as Counts Three,

¹ The Defendant was not charged in the remaining Counts of the Third Superseding Indictment.

Five, Six through Twenty-Six, Twenty-Seven, Thirty-Nine, Forty, Forty-Two, Forty-Five, and Forty-Eight of the Third Superseding Indictment;

WHEREAS, when the Defendant was arrested on or about June 22, 2011, at 1012 Third Street, Apartment 303, Santá Monica, California, law enforcement seized the following items from the Defendant:

- (a) \$821,799.49 in United States currency;
- (b) firearms, ammunition, and other weapons, including the following:
 - a. Colt Lightweight Officers ACP, .45 caliber handgun with one empty magazine, serial number DL01173;
 - b. Auto Ordinance Thompson model number ZG51/Pitbull, .45 caliber pistol with one empty magazine, serial number AOC59609;
 - c. Smith & Wesson model number 4006, .40 caliber pistol with one empty magazine, serial number VDF1743;
 - d. Colt Defender Series 60, .45 caliber handgun with one empty magazine, serial number DR06879;
 - e. Smith & Wesson, .38 caliber pistol, serial number 130015;
 - f. Springfield Armory model number 1911-A1, .45 caliber handgun with one empty magazine, serial number N480918;
 - g. Mossberg model number KPR12, .12 caliber pistol, serial number 777522A;
 - h. Colt Sporter Lightweight, .223 caliber rifle, serial number 003906;
 - i. Mossberg model number 500A, .12 caliber shotgun, serial number L489673;
 - j. Sturm Ruger & Co. Inc. model mini 14, .223 caliber rifle, serial number 181-59582;
 - k. Smith & Wesson, .38 caliber pistol, serial number 2710;
 - 1. Professional Ordnance, Inc. model carbon 15 pistol, .223 caliber pistol, serial number B24867;

- m. Colt Detective Special, .38 caliber revolver, serial number D0017R;
- n. Taurus, .357 magnum revolver, serial number NJ131942;
- o. Taurus, .357 revolver, serial number 2352;
- p. Beretta model number 92 FS, .9 caliber pistol with one empty magazine, serial number E505032;
- q. Springfield Armory Micro Compact, .45 caliber pistol with one magazine, serial number 428626;
- r. Smith & Wesson, .357 revolver, serial number CCV0997;
- s. North American Arms, Inc., .22 magnum revolver, serial number E073535;
- t. Beretta model MOD21A-22L.R, .22 caliber pistol with one empty magazine, serial number DAA016388;
- u. 22/45, .22 caliber handgun with one empty magazine, serial number 220-39720;
- v. Colt MK IV Series 80, .45 caliber pistol with one empty magazine, serial number FC32853;
- w. Kimber Stainless Ultra Carry II, .45 caliber pistol with one empty magazine, serial number KU35555;
- x. Smith & Wesson model number 65-3, .354 caliber revolver, serial number 18924:
- y. one inert facsimile grenade;
- z. Springfield Armory Champion, .45 caliber pistol with one empty magazine, serial number N480948;
- aa. High Standard Derringer D-100, .22 caliber pistol, serial number 2169503;
- bb. Rossi, .38 Special Revolver, serial number D620120;
- cc. Smith & Wesson, .38 caliber pistol, serial number 11296;
- dd. Kimber Ultra Carry II, .45 caliber pistol with one empty magazine, serial number KU42880;
- ee. Springfield Armory model 1911 Champion, .45 caliber pistol with one empty magazine, serial number NM139014;

- ff. one black Stun Blaster Taser;
- gg. miscellaneous rounds of ammunition and magazines;
- hh. miscellaneous holsters and accessories; and
- ii. approximately eight knives;
- (c) personal property, including but not limited to, jewelry, electronics, art, furniture, household items, clothing, personal effects, and any and all other personal property, excluding one Stanley Cup ring²

(collectively, the "Forfeitable Assets");

WHEREAS, based on the evidence and testimony presented at trial, the Defendant's subsequent conviction, and the United States' Motion for Preliminary Order of Forfeiture (Specific Assets), the United States has established the requisite nexus between the Forfeitable Assets and the racketeering offenses on which the Defendant was convicted, and accordingly, the Forfeitable Assets are subject to forfeiture to the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963; and

WHEREAS, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963 and Rule 32.2(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the United States is now entitled to a Preliminary Order of Forfeiture (Specific Assets) against the Forfeitable Assets.

ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:

1. The Court finds, pursuant to Rule 32.2(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the government has established the requisite nexus between the Forfeitable Assets and the offenses to which the Defendant was convicted.

² The United States seized from the Defendant's Santa Monica apartment one ring that is a replica of a Stanley Cup championship ring, that bears the year "1986" and a logo that depicts the "Montreal Canadians." The Defendant asserts that this ring was a gift, and accordingly is not proceeds traceable to his racketeering violations. The United States excluded this ring from its Motion for Preliminary Order of Forfeiture (Specific Assets), but reserved its right to seek forfeiture of the ring as a substitute asset to satisfy any money judgment entered against the Defendant.

- 2. Accordingly, all of the Defendants' interests in the Forfeitable Assets are hereby forfeited to the United States of America for disposition pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963.
- 3. Pursuant to Rule 32.2(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the United States is hereby authorized to seize the Forfeitable Assets and maintain them in its secure custody and control.
- 4. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(*l*) and Rule 32.2(b)(6)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the United States shall publish, for thirty (30) consecutive calendar days on the government forfeiture website www.forfeiture.gov, notice of the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture (Specific Assets) and notice of the United States' intent to dispose of the Forfeitable Assets.
- 5. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (*l*), the United States shall give, to the extent practicable, direct written notice to any person known to have alleged an interest in the Forfeitable Assets to be forfeited.
- 6. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (*l*), the notice referred to above shall state: (a) that any person, other than the Defendant, asserting a legal interest in the Forfeitable Assets, shall, within sixty (60) days after the first day of publication on the government forfeiture website or within thirty (30) days after receipt of actual notice, whichever is earlier, file a petition with the United States District Court in Boston, Massachusetts, requesting a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his or her interest in the Forfeitable Assets; and (b) that the petition shall be signed by the petitioner under the penalty of perjury and shall set forth the nature and extent of the petitioner's right, title, or interest in the Forfeitable Assets, the time and circumstances of the petitioner's acquisition of the right, title, or interest in the Forfeitable Assets, any additional facts supporting the petitioner's claim, and the relief sought.

- 7. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(*l*), following the Court's disposition of all petitions filed under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(*l*), or if no such petitions are filed following the expiration of the period provided in 18 U.S.C. § 1963(*l*) for the filing of such petitions, the United States of America shall have clear title to the Forfeitable Assets.
- 8. Upon adjudication of all third party interests, this Court will enter a Final Order of Forfeiture, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963 and Rule 32.2(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in which all interests will be addressed.
- 9. Pursuant to Rule 32.2(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Preliminary Order of Forfeiture (Specific Assets) will become final as to the Defendant at the time of his sentencing, will be part of the Defendant's criminal sentence, and will be included in the criminal judgment entered by this Court against the Defendant.

Date: November 14, 2013

DENISE J. CASPER V United States District Judge